William Lane Craig has defended the following two contentions: (1) If theism is true, we have a sound foundation for morality, and, (2) If theism is false, we do not have a sound foundation for morality. Erik Wielenberg rejects (2). Specifically, Wielenberg argues that naturalists have resources to make sense of objective moral values, moral duties, and moral knowledge. In response to Wielenberg, I defend Craig’s second contention by arguing that Wielenberg’s theory fails to robustly capture our moral phenomenology as (...) well as make intelligible robust moral knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ST. AUGUSTINE'S NOVELISTIC CONVERSION Tyler Graham Syracuse University In his famous biography of St. Augustine, Peter Brown attempts to explainwhat set the Confessions "apart from the intellectual tradition to which Augustine belonged" (Augustine ofHippo 169). While he concedes that "the Confessions are a masterpiece ofstrictly intellectual autobiography" (167), he concludes that it is more important to realize that they "are, quite succinctly, the story of Augustine's 'heart,' or (...) of his 'feelings'—his affectus"(169). He continues to explain that "in the Confessions, however, the evocation of Augustine's feelings forms part of the wider study of the evolution ofhis will" (172). Thus, Brown suggests that Augustine's central anthropological concern is to determine the origin and/or causes ofhuman desire (i.e. the "evolution of will"). Augustine's "exhaustive analysis ofhis motives" (as Brown describes it) is linked to his lifetime struggle to explain the complex interaction between his free will and a divine will (grace) to transform his "sinful" desires and create a "new heart" within him. In Brown's view, the Confessions reflect Augustine's struggle to discover whether desire originates in God or man. We can agree with Brown that this theological agenda is important to Augustine, for it will resurface in all of his theological struggles stretching from his pre-Christian engagement with the Manichees to his final battle with Pelagius. Nevertheless, I will argue in this paper that the Confessions reflect another important dimension to Augustine's morphology ofdesire. Regardless 136Tyler Graham of its divine or human source, Augustine's desires often begin with the imitation of another person. In portraying examples of his life up to and including his famous conversion in the year 386 (Book VIII), Augustine consistently shows that his desires have been copies or imitations ofvarious models whom he has chosen to follow. Writers such as Brown have considered the importance ofdesire (or the will) in the Confessions, and critics like Geoffrey Harpham (whom we will address later) have examined Augustine's interest in mimesis during various scenes in the book. Yet, with the exception ofAvitol Wohlman, no one (to my knowledge) has adequately considered the combination of the two: mimetic desire. In the first book ofthe Confessions, Augustine recounts his childhood, and, by the eighth chapter, he has already introduced a theme which will haunt the entire work: the link between desire and language. My desires were internal; adults were external to me and had no means ofentering into my soul. So I threw my limbs about and uttered sounds, signs resembling my wishes. (1:8) Language is born as a result ofthe need to express desire. For Augustine, words, gestures, and all utterances connect the "internal" wants to the "external" object ofcommunication (in this case, adults). In fact, ifAugustine links desire with the soul (external adults could not "enter his soul"), then language becomes the bridge between souls: it communicates desire from soul to soul. When Augustine reaches boyhood, and he begins to learn the accepted modes of articulation, the link between language and desire remains: "By groans and various sounds and various movements of parts of my body I would endeavor to express the intentions ofmy heart to persuade people to bow to my will" (1:13). Language communicates desire, but it also seeks to transform and generate desire. Beyond simply explaining his wishes, Augustine's language is persuasive, seeking to get others to "bow to my will." Whereas some people would like to remember their childhood as a time of innocence, joy, and peace, Augustine depicts his early life as "sinful," unhappy, and fraught with tears and conflicting interests. For an infant ofthat age, could itbe reckoned good to use tears in trying to obtain what it would have been harmful to get?.. The feebleness of infant limbs is innocent, not the infant's mind. (1:11) St. Augustine 's Novelistic Conversion137 Although he does notrememberbis own infancy, Augustine extrapolates from his analysis ofother children. I have personally watched and studied a jealous baby. He could not yet speak and, pale with jealousy and bitterness, glared at his brother sharing his mother's milk. Who is unaware ofthis fact ofexperience? Envy among infants is universal... (shrink)

In his recently published Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, & Naturalism 2011 Alvin Plantinga criticises Paul Draper’s evolutionary argument against theism as part of a larger project to show that evolution poses no threat to Christian belief. Plantinga focuses upon Draper’s probabilistic claim that the facts of evolution are much more probable on naturalism than on theism, and with regard to that claim makes two specific points. First, Draper’s probabilistic claim contradicts theism’s necessary falsehood; unless Draper wishes to (...) acknowledge that theism is necessarily true, his claim commits him to theism’s contingency and so sets him at odds with a mainstream that sees God’s existence as decidedly noncontingent. Second, Plantinga argues that Draper’s probabilistic claim is, even if true, overwhelmed by counterclaims about facts that are more likely on theism than naturalism. I argue this critique of Draper depends upon a serious error, and that Plantinga overlooks the full implications of his own presuppositions. Correcting these shortcomings shows that Plantinga’s own probabilistic-apologetics (e.g., the ‘Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism’) requires theism’s contingency no less than does Draper’s atheology. (shrink)

Kant and Sidgwick agree that genuine ethical principles must be sourced in reason rather than divine commands. Yet, despite sharing this secular starting point, both philosophers ultimately conclude that the assumption of God’s existence is necessary for the complete viability of practical reason (including principles of morality) within human beings. This mutual reintroduction of God is especially surprising given that Kant and Sidgwick advocate divergent moral theories. The central claim of this chapter is that, despite their philosophical differences, Kant’s and (...) Sidgwick’s respective appeals to the moral necessity of God have a common cause. Both philosophers perceive a deep human need to believe in cosmic justice (i.e., universal harmony between duty and happiness), and their shared hedonic account of well-being colors their conception of what such justice must involve. After explaining how these ideas give rise to the ostensible moral need for faith, I provide a brief defense of an alternative view based on the Stoic belief that the universe is ultimately just, despite the lack of a reliable connection between moral virtue and hedonic well-being. (shrink)

The richness of the term “unsettling” has made it readily employable for phenomenological accounts of racism in philosophy of race literature; yet, the term has been left largely under-theorized. Here, I argue that unsettling encounters can be said to occur when the unfamiliar other has come into contact with the boundary of one’s existential home. For many white people, interracial interactions produce an (often unwarranted) feeling of physical danger, but as I hope to show, this habitual (mis)perception of such encounters (...) is not merely a conditioned response; it also functions to subvert situations that might unsettle white identifies partially constituted by phenomenological demarcations of space along racial lines. Drawing on empirical literature and recent developments in critical phenomenology, I suggest that by exercising habitual, racist gestures and perceptions, white people (mis)perceive ontological threats to their worldview—e.g., a bookish Black student or a masculine gay man—as ontically threatening so as to avoid the kind of work and existential anguish that altering one’s normative expectations would require. (shrink)

This article explicates the notion of face, which Emmanuel Levinasunderstands as trace, in terms of the tautegorical. In opposition to the allegorical, the tautegorical is neither representational nor referential in the traditional sense. In contradistinction to the tautological, the tautegorical indicates an a-symmetrical and therefore not to be inverted identity between the so-called origin of the trace and the trace itself. Accordingly, a smile is happiness, but happiness—qua origin of the smile—is not reducible to the smile. Now, if the face (...) of the Other is, as Levinas suggests, the trace of the wholly Other, i.e., God, then Derrida’s question arises as to whether God is but an effect of the trace. This essay argues in the negative. Traces condition their origins as after-effects without the origins becoming mere consequences of the posterior; this is the proper way of accounting for Levinas’s notion of the “posteriority of the anterior.”. (shrink)

F.W.J. Schelling’s late distinction between negative and positive philosophy correlates negative philosophy with critical philosophy, which delimits what could be said of things without yet actually being able to do so. Positive philosophy, however, is able to make assertions about the actual existence of such objects without transgressing Kant’s prison of finitude, i.e., without moving from an immanent, subjective and transcendental position to a transcendent object. Schelling’s later positive philosophy rather asserts that one begins outside Kant’s prison. This is not (...) a dogmatism or, more properly, a dogmatizing philosophy, that attempts to reach the transcendent from an immanent locus, transcendental subjectivity, but it is a “doctrinal philosophy” that begins in transcendence and then has as its task the consequent construction of the domain of transcendental subjectivity. By this means, Schelling’s positive philosophy, which he also deems a “historical” and “progressive” philosophy, exposes what Quentin Meillassoux has termed “the great outdoors.” Schelling, however, does not show how one might acquire access to this absolute outside, but he argues that one should depart from it. Transcendence is not the aim of knowledge but the absolute prius from which positive, i.e., progressive, philosophy begins. (shrink)

This article presents Schelling’s doctrine of creation, primarily as outlined in his lectures on mythology and revelation. Schelling there presents not a will to power, but a power to will or not to will—the decisiveness of freedom rather than blind willing. Accordingly, Schelling is able to surpass the tradition of the metaphysics of presence through freedom as an unprecognoscible act prior to potency/power. Schelling’s will is not natural but preternatural, capable of bringing forth something original, i.e., that which first becomes (...) possible only once it has already become actual. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to substantiate Agamben’s thesis that the originary experience of language as a performative speech-act, i.e. as an oath that guarantees the veridicality or efficacy of the speech-act, exposes the ethical relation to language as the origination of the human qua human, despite Agamben’s disenchantment rather than re-enchantment of language. This task first requires the elucidation of the seemingly magical and intimate connection between words and things, which will be proposed under the rubric of ”tautegory’. (...) Finally, I will seek to show how Agamben’s analysis of language as performative and anthropogenic is not just ethical, but also opens the space for a profane Messiah. Agamben’s profane messianism will be elucidated through an analysis of the Voice as the witness to the pre-linguistic. (shrink)

This article argues that Schelling, contrary to the traditional view which situates him as the mediator between Fichte and Hegel, the link from the absolute activity of the ego to the absolute activity constitutive of transcendental idealism, offered one of the first attempts to ground philosophy in a fundamental passivity. Schelling’s Erlangen lectures (1820-21) in particular provide a penetrating critique of idealistic modes of thought. I will show that these lectures, along with Schelling’s late philosophy as a whole, elaborate consciousness (...) as what is most problematic instead of the firm foundation. Instead of beginning with transcendental consciousness as its terminus a quo he views it as the terminus ad quem, namely, that which is most in need of explanation and justification. Consciousness arises in passivity thought as a preconscious affection. I will first outline the idea of passivity through an exposition of Entsetzung. Next, I will analyze Schelling’s notion of the World Law or law of either/or as the impetus to freedom, that which sets freedom free. I will then show how this manner of thought circumvents traditional metaphysical thinking, i.e., the so-called philosophy of presence. Schelling offers not a will to power but freedom as the will to or not to power, as that which can or can also not be. Lastly, I will briefly outline some of the ramifications of this for Schelling’s philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

F.W.J. von Schelling’s positive philosophy of mythology and revelation questions how one can move from the natural (the negative or mythology) to freedom (the positive or revelation), i.e. from the natural to the supernatural. The move from nature to freedom surpasses the traditional metaphysics of presence. Being is not simply the presencing of nature but the result of a decisive deed surpassing and supplementing nature. Nature can do nothing other than presence. Freedom, however, could also not be. It could remain (...) in concealment and must not necessarily presence as nature does. The origin is a supplement because an unnecessary excess extraneous to nature. In other words, origins always supplement the natural, i.e. they are supernatural and revelatory. Origins bring something novel, i.e. something original, into being but origins themselves remain in non-being and consequently remain un-revealed. The origin cannot exist, i.e. cannot become present, because it is always qualitatively Past. The origin never was but always already has been . Primal repetition was freedom’s subjection of nature to the Past and a deferral of this deed’s consequences to the indefinite Future. (shrink)

This paper concerns top-down approaches in machine ethics. It is divided into three main parts. First, I briefly describe top-down design approaches, and in doing so I make clear what those approaches are committed to and what they involve when it comes to training an AI to behave ethically. In the second part, I formulate two underappreciated motivations for endorsing them, one relating to predictability of machine behavior and the other relating to scrutability of machine decision-making. Finally, I present three (...) major worries about such approaches, and I attempt to show that advocates of top-down approaches have some plausible avenues of response. I focus most of my attention on what I call the ‘technical manual objection’ to top-down approaches, inspired by the work of Annas (2004). In short, the idea is that top-down approaches treat ethical decision-making as being merely a matter of following some ethical instructions in the same way that one might follow some set of instructions contained in a technical manual (e.g., computer manual), and this invites sensible skepticism about the ethical wisdom of machines that have been trained on those approaches. I respond by claiming that the objection is successful only if it is understood as targeting machines that have certain kinds of goals, and it should not compel us to totally abandon top-down approaches. Such approaches could still be reasonably employed to design ethical AI that operate in contexts that include fairly noncontroversial answers to ethical questions. In fact, we should prefer top-down approaches when it comes to those types of context, or so I argue, due to the advantages I claim for them. (shrink)

This article presents Schelling’s doctrine of creation, primarily as outlined in his lectures on mythology and revelation. Schelling there presents not a will to power, but a power to will or not to will—the decisiveness of freedom rather than blind willing. Accordingly, Schelling is able to surpass the tradition of the metaphysics of presence through freedom as an unprecognoscible act prior to potency/power. Schelling’s will is not natural but preternatural, capable of bringing forth something original, i.e., that which first becomes (...) possible only once it has already become actual. (shrink)

Since Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), historians and philosophers of science have paid increasing attention to the implications of disciplinarity. In this chapter we consider restrictions posed to interdisciplinary exchange between ecology and economics that result from a particular kind of commitment to the ideal of disciplinary purity, that is, that each discipline is defined by an appropriate, unique set of objects, methods, theories, and aims. We argue that, when it comes to the objects of study in (...) ecology and economics, ideas of disciplinary purity have been underwritten by the artificial-natural distinction. We then problematize this distinction, and thus disciplinary purity, both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, the distinction is no longer tenable. Empirically, recent interdisciplinary research has shown the epistemological and policy-oriented benefits of dealing with models which explicitly link anthropogenic (i.e., “artificial”) and non-anthropogenic factors (i.e., “natural”). We conclude that, in the current age of the Anthropocene, it is to be expected that without interdisciplinary exchange, ecology and economics may relinquish global relevance because the distinct and separate systems to which each “pure” science was originally made to apply will only diminish over time. (shrink)

This review article provides a new perspective on the ethics of green nudging. We advance a new model for assessing the ethical permissibility of green nudges (GNs). On this model, which provides normative guidance for policymakers, a GN is ethically permissible when the intervention is (1) efficacious, (2) cost-effective, and (3) the advantages of the GN (i.e. reducing the environmental harm) are not outweighed by countervailing costs/harms (i.e. for nudgees). While traditional ethical objections to nudges (paternalism, etc.) remain potential normative (...) costs associated with GNs, any such costs must be weighed against the injunction to reduce environmental harm to third parties. (shrink)

Frant︠s︡uzʹka revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ii︠a︡: prokhodz︠h︡enni︠a︡ cherez smertʹ -- Romantyzm i khytristʹ dobra: Mefistofel i︠a︡k kulʹturnyĭ heroĭ -- Narodz︠h︡enni︠a︡ totalʹnosti: slabkistʹ indyvida, syla kolektyvnykh til -- Klas i︠a︡k hrupa obranykh: marksyzm -- Rasa i︠a︡k "use": rasyzm i zakhid -- Hotui︠u︡chysʹ do katastrof: palinhenesii︠a︡ i kinet︠s︡ʹ stolitti︠a︡ -- Fashyzm: triumf transheokratiï -- Nat︠s︡yzm: rasa i︠a︡ zakon -- Komunizm: vid emansypat︠s︡iï do rabstva -- Rosiĭsʹka ideolohii︠a︡: sumishi ta ekstremy -- Zamistʹ vysnovkiv: plynnistʹ ideolohiĭ i XXI stolitti︠a︡.

This paper examines confidentiality and its nature and analyses the guidelines laid down by the Hippocratic Oath as well as the British and World Medical Associations for maintaining such confidentiality between doctor and patient. There are exceptions to practically any code of rules and this is true also for confidentiality. Some of these exceptions make it appear that very little is confidential. The three values implicit in confidentiality would seem to be privacy, confidence and secrecy. Each of these values is (...) discussed and developed in this paper. In conclusion, the question is suggested that maybe in the face of death, doctor and patient need to re-examine the pre-suppositions of privacy, confidence and secrecy on which the confidential relationship is based. (shrink)

t. 1.Novoe mirovozzrenie i novai͡a teorii͡a nauki -- t. 2. [without special title].

vyp. 1. Obshchestvennyi︠a︡ nauki i teoreticheskai︠a︡ filosofīi︠a︡.

Автор ярким и доступным языком описывает жизнь Сократа и его философское мировоззрение, а также на основе источников путем логических рассуждений опровергает многие ошибочные представления об этом философе. Для историков и широкого круга читателей.

A report of a problem-based learning project on the ethics of terminal care, offered as one of the options available to first year MB ChB students in Edinburgh University Medical School. The project formed part of the 'clinical correlation course' in the new curriculum. Six students took part under the supervision of two clinical tutors and a moral philosopher. The course was case-based and practical with students being given the opportunity over a period of eight weeks to meet patients, relatives (...) and hospital staff at a local geriatrics hospital and terminal care home. The main issue studied was the degree of choice available to patients electing to be treated at home, in hospital or in a hospice. Other issues included: pre-death, disposal of the dead, certification of death, communication with relatives and follow-up bereavement services. (shrink)

On World Philosophy Day, November 15, 2018, the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences organized the international conference on the Russian classic writer I.S. Turgenev. During the plenary and two breakout sessions, speeches were given by philosophers, cultural researchers, historians ofRussia,USA,Germany,Austria. The conference’s attitude to the consideration of the multifaceted heritage of the great Russian writer made it possible to highlight in the modern historical and cultural context many aspects of Turgenev’s work, to rethink stereotypes existing among (...) researchers and in the mass consciousness regarding Turgenev. At the conference, Turgenev was presented as a political thinker, a liberal who embodied spiritual asceticism, a supporter of the dialogue of cultures, a “Russian European” who does not accept “new barbarism” in all its manifestations from radicalism to Russian exclusivity idea. In the reports and speeches, attention was drawn to the cultural bilingualism inherent in Turgenev, his ability of non-biased artistic and philosophical observation, which enabled him to analyze the then state of minds in Russian society, to foresee many collisions inherent in the national historical process in the 20th – early 21st centuries and world cultural trends engendered by the “uprising of the masses,” to anticipate the drama of the absurd. At the conference, among the discussed topics were the themes of nihilism and loneliness, viewed through the prism of the existential experience of the writer and world literary characters. (shrink)

Brian Ellis has argued that the assigning of forces is, in the final analysis, a matter of convention. This conclusion is backed by the premises (1) that forces and force-effects are necessary and sufficient for each other, and (2) that the classification of some state of affairs as a force-effect is at least partly conventional. We argue that the first premise is false, that the second premise is ambiguous as between several senses of "conventional," and finally that he has not (...) established that force-effects are conventional in the sense required for the conclusion he wishes to draw. (shrink)